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Abstract 
 
Analyst research is alleged to be biased because of conflicts of interest when analysts’ 
employers underwrite securities for the firms covered. I posit that affiliated analyst 
optimism should be the strongest for offering firms with a desire to over-inflate stock 
prices. I hypothesize that a firm’s corporate governance and its CEO incentives are 
related to the affiliation bias. Using stock recommendations data, I find evidence that the 
affiliation bias is indeed more pervasive for firms with high CEO wealth sensitivity to 
stock price (i.e., high CEO delta). The larger affiliation bias for high delta firms remains 
even after the introduction of regulatory reforms aimed at limiting analyst optimism. 
There is mixed evidence that firms with poorer corporate governance have more serious 
analyst affiliation biases. Examining event reactions to recommendations, I find that the 
market does not sufficiently discount the fact that affiliated analyst optimism is more 
serious for some firms. I also show post-offering evidence suggestive of quid quo pro in 
that hyping banks win more future deals from high delta firms while the firm’s CEO 
makes more insider stock sales.  
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Hype my stock: Do firms really want biased research?
1. Introduction  
Prior literature on conflicts of interest suggests that security underwriting results in 
overly-optimistic sell-side analyst research. Consequently, analysts whose investment banks are 
affiliated with the issuing firm are likely to produce over-optimistic research. It is puzzling, 
however, that the empirical evidence supporting this notion is at best mixed. On the one hand, 
Michaely and Womack (1999) find that affiliated analysts issue more biased research. On the 
other hand, Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) find little evidence that investment banking 
conflicts lead to more biased affiliated analyst advice. This disparate evidence is highlighted best 
in the survey by Mehran and Stulz (2007) who detail the mixed evidence surrounding conflicts 
of interest and analyst optimism.1
This paper postulates that affiliated analyst optimism could be more serious for firms that 
have stronger desires to inflate their stock prices. Prior studies often assume that all firms desire 
over-optimistic analyst research and are willing to pay to obtain it. For instance, Krigman, Shaw, 
and Womack (2001) report survey evidence that analyst coverage is one of the main reasons why 
firms switch underwriters. Degeorge, Derrien, and Womack (2007) posit the analyst hype 
hypothesis: that IPO firms prefer book-building over auctions because the book-building 
package includes hyped analyst coverage. Cliff and Denis (2004) find that firms use IPO 
underpricing to purchase star analyst coverage and interpret their evidence as consistent with the 
                                                 
1 For e.g., other papers showing that conflicts lead to more biased research are Lin and McNichols (1998), James 
and Karceski (2006), McNichols, O'Brien, and Pamukcu (2006), and recently, Chahine, Ljungqvist, and Michaely 
(2008). Papers showing that conflicts do not lead to more biased research are Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 
(2006) and Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007). See Table 1 of Mehran and Stulz (2007) for a longer list of 
papers.  
 
 analyst lust hypothesis in Loughran and Ritter (2004)—that firms underprice IPOs to obtain 
favorable coverage from influential analysts.  
This paper postulates that some firms could desire biased analyst research more than 
others. The focus is on two main firm characteristics, corporate governance and CEO wealth 
sensitivity to stock price. While one can think of other potential dimensions (I consider some in 
robustness tests), these two examined characteristics are intuitive, easily developed, and draw on 
supporting evidence from past literature. From the corporate governance perspective, if biased 
analyst research is detrimental to a firm’s shareholders, well governed firms will be less likely to 
seek biased research. Attempts to boost the current stock price can benefit existing shareholders 
(for e.g., the firm may be able to raise equity cheaply) but this short-term benefit must be 
balanced against the long-term cost of misleading the market. If a firm considers the welfare of 
long-term shareholders, it may be less likely to participate in such short-term gaming (Jensen 
(2005)).  
The second setting considers the firm’s managerial compensation since managers can 
directly benefit from overvaluation if their wealth is tied to the firm’s stock price. Although tying 
managerial wealth to stock price presumably aligns the interests of managers to the interests of 
shareholders, this mechanism could have the perverse effect of inducing managers to prop up 
stock prices artificially. For e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that the use of 
discretionary accruals to manipulate earnings is more pronounced when the CEO’s wealth is 
more sensitive to stock price. Burns and Kedia (2006) show that corporate misreporting is more 
prevalent at firms whose CEOs’ option wealth is more sensitive to stock price. I posit that firms 
could also use the channel of biased analyst advice to boost the stock price. Mayew (2008) 
provides suggestive evidence. He shows that the probability that an analyst participates in a 
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 conference call is positively related to the analyst’s optimism and that this relation is stronger for 
firms whose managers have higher wealth sensitivities to stock price.  
This paper relates closely to the literature showing that analysts tend to provide over-
optimistic advice on average. Boni and Womack (2002) describe four pressures driving this 
overall optimism. The analyst faces pressures from, 1) the investment bank who wants more 
brokerage and advisory business, 2) the management of the covered firm who wants its stock 
touted, 3) institutional clients of the bank who are long the stock, and 4) the conflicts created by 
the analyst’s personal investments.2 While most of the existing work on conflicts focuses on the 
first source of pressures (the supply of biased research), my study focuses on the second source 
of pressures—the pressure from firms who desire over-optimistic research (the demand for 
biased research). Another distinguishing feature of this paper is that it investigates the affiliation 
bias rather than the overall bias. Studies that have examined whether the overall optimism bias 
depends on firm characteristics are, for e.g., Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007) 
and Lim (2001). 
This study uses data from I/B/E/S detail stock recommendations from 1994 to 2006. I 
define an affiliated analyst as one whose bank was a lead or co-manager of the firm’s equity 
offering in the prior three years. I follow Ljungqvist et al. (2007) in building a calendar-time 
panel of an analyst’s relative recommendations versus peers who cover the same firm. I find 
some evidence that the affiliation bias is worse for firms with poor corporate governance. In 
general, this evidence depends on the governance proxies employed. However, I find robust 
evidence that firms with high CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price (i.e., high CEO delta firms) 
are associated with larger analyst affiliation biases. This affiliated analyst hype remains even 
after controlling for the overall reduction in optimism as result of investment bank reforms in 
                                                 
2 Ritter (2007) also discusses the first three pressures. 
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 2003. I surmise that high delta firms continue to pressure affiliated analysts to supply over-
optimistic advice even in the post-regulation period. 
I then examine if the market is aware of cross-sectional differences in affiliation biases by 
comparing the average rating change event cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of affiliated 
versus unaffiliated analysts. Although investors discount the recommendations of affiliated 
analysts’ on average, they do not discount affiliated recommendations issued on high CEO delta 
firms more than they discount affiliated recommendations on other firms. This suggests that the 
market is not fully cognizant of the stronger analyst affiliation bias of such firms. 
While results are consistent with the idea that the firm induces its affiliated analyst to 
issue a biased report, an alternative explanation is that the affiliated analyst has private positive 
information about the firm (McNichols and O'Brien (1997)). If this selection story were true, the 
recommendations of the affiliated analyst would outperform those of unaffiliated analysts. I 
compare calendar-time portfolios of high delta firms with and without affiliated analyst hype. 
Inconsistent with the selection story, there is no evidence of the hyped firm portfolio 
outperforming the non-hyped portfolio. Instead, the hyped firm portfolio significantly 
underperforms in both value-weighted and equal-weighted average returns. 
One can interpret the evidence as firms pressuring affiliated analysts to issue over-
optimistic recommendations. Firms (and their insiders) may benefit from a temporarily boosted 
share price if the market does not discount such hyping. In return, the potential payoff for the 
affiliated analyst could be in the form of access to management or future deal business for the 
bank. To search for evidence of quid quo pro between the firm and the investment bank, I count 
the incidence of future equity offerings. I focus on high delta firms since the evidence on this 
firm characteristic is the most robust. I find that banks that hype win a larger fraction of 
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 mandates for future deals. On the side of the payoffs to the firm, I examine insider sales data and 
find that the net sales of stock by the CEO in the years after the offering are significantly higher 
for high delta firms with hype than without hype. This is consistent with CEOs benefitting or 
attempting to benefit from the hyping of their firm’s stock by affiliated analysts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the methodology and 
hypotheses, Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics of the sample, Section 4 reports 
main results, Section 5 examines the market’s reaction to the affiliation bias and develops further 
tests, and finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Methodology and hypotheses 
2.1. Empirical model 
To measure analyst optimism, I focus on stock recommendations rather than on earnings 
forecasts since the alleged impact of conflicts of interest on stock recommendations is 
unambiguously upward. The effect of conflicts on earnings forecasts is more ambiguous. 
Conflicts could bias earnings forecasts upward because optimism enables analysts to curry favor 
with management (Lim (2001)), or conflicts could bias earnings forecasts downward so that 
firms are able to beat forecasted earnings (e.g., Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (2007)). The 
basic empirical model is as follows.  
 ( ) ijtijtijtijtijtijt FirmCharAffiliatedFirmCharAffiliatedRelRec εδβαη +′+×+++= Xγ . (1) 
RelRecijt is analyst i’s average end-of-quarter relative recommendation minus the end-of-quarter 
median outstanding recommendation (i.e. consensus) across all analysts covering firm j in year t. 
I construct this as an annual panel since most of the variables in the model are measured annually 
and not quarterly. For variables that can be measured quarterly, like RelRecijt in this case, the 
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 average of the quarterly observations within year t is computed. To allow the magnitude of 
RelRecijt to be positively associated with relative optimism, I reverse ratings from I/B/E/S so that 
a strong buy has a rating of 5 and a sell has a rating of 1.  
Affiliatedijt is a dummy variable indicating that the analyst’s employer has an 
underwriting relationship (primary or secondary equity offering) with the covered firm j during 
the prior three years. Because my focus is on the optimism of equity research, affiliation is based 
on past equity issuance rather than debt issuance or merger and acquisition advisory 
relationships.3 Allowing the affiliation to be active for up to three years follows Lin and 
McNichols (1998).4 FirmCharijt takes value of one when the firm is hypothesized to be more 
likely to pressure its affiliated analysts to issue biased research.  is a vector of control 
variables of analyst, bank, and firm characteristics. The calendar-time panel setup is similar in 
spirit to the model in Ljungqvist et al. (2007), except that they do not examine an interaction 
term with analyst affiliation.  
X
The model is estimated via OLS analyst fixed effects and with the standard errors 
clustered by analyst. Having analyst fixed effects is equivalent to asking whether an analyst who 
covers n firms is more optimistic than peers for firms with certain identified characteristics. 
Analyst clustering accounts for the fact that observations from the same analyst may not be 
independent within the panel.5  
                                                 
3 Affiliation can also come from mutual funds. Guidolin and Mola (2008) show that analysts are more optimistic 
about firms held by their bank’s affiliated mutual funds. 
4 Some papers assume affiliation lasts for five years (Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)) while some assume 
it lasts only one to two years (Michaely and Womack (1999)). My results are generally stronger when affiliation is 
assumed to last for a shorter number of years but choosing three years matches the horizon dictated in NASD 
regulations that banks disclose underwriting relationships in the prior three years. 
5 Other forms of estimation, for e.g., using analyst fixed effects and firm-level clustered standard errors, or using 
generalized least squares with analyst random effects yields similar results. Finally, because the dependent variable 
in Eq. 1 is not normally distributed but bounded in [-4,4], I also estimate an ordered probit model in which the 
dependent variable takes on three values: above the consensus, at the consensus, or below the consensus. The results 
are similar with this alternative estimation method and are unreported in most tables.  
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 2.2. Hypothesized firm characteristics that affect affiliation bias  
Hypothesis 1: Overall affiliation bias 
We test if α is positive, which indicates that affiliated analysts are more likely than 
unaffiliated analysts to issue optimistic stock recommendations. 
Hypothesis 2A: Poor corporate governance worsens the affiliation bias 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B investigate if the affiliation bias is more serious for a particular 
firm type. δ is positive if the hypothesized firm type is associated with more affiliated analyst 
optimism. Hypothesis 2A tests if firms’ corporate governance characteristics are associated with 
affiliated analyst optimism.6 The underlying motivation is that a well governed firm will not 
mislead the market with biased analyst advice if short-term overvaluation incurs detrimental 
long-term costs for shareholders. Jensen (2005) argues that short-term gaming leading to 
overvalued equity can ultimately lead to the destruction of part or all of the firm’s core value (see 
also Fuller and Jensen (2002)). Well governed firms may thus be less likely to engage in 
encouraging or supporting analyst hype. 
Two proxies for governance are used. The first is the governance index (G-index) by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) counts the number of 
adopted anti-takeover provisions (1 to 18) that protect managers from the discipline of the 
corporate control market. Entrenched managers could pursue their own interests in empire 
building, leading to shareholder wealth destruction. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that 
firms with more anti-takeover provisions make more value-destroying acquisitions. If these 
                                                 
6 Although corporate governance is endogenous, the analysis here will not suffer from the issue of endogeneity 
as long as one can argue that E(PoorGovijt×εijt)=0. Clearly, if the dependent variable were firm value, then 
E(PoorGovijt×εijt)≠0. However, the dependent variable in this paper is not an outcome variable of the firm but an 
individual analyst’s relative optimism. By definition, this means that for a firm, some of its covering analysts would 
be optimistic and some would be pessimistic. Consequently, it is less likely that an analyst being more optimistic 
affects the firm’s governance structure since there are also other analysts who are pessimistic at the same time. 
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 acquisitions are financed in part by the firm’s equity, the incentive for optimistic affiliated 
analyst advice could be higher. I identify a firm as poorly governed (FirmCharijt= 
PoorGovGindexijt =1) when its most recently reported G-index ≥10. This corresponds to the 
bottom five deciles in Gompers et al. and accounts for 40% of the G-index firm-years.  
The disadvantage of the G-index is that it measures only one dimension of corporate 
governance—managerial entrenchment. Entrenchment may not be unequivocally bad according 
to Stein (1988), since managers subject to takeover discipline may want to pump up current 
earnings so as to avoid being taken over at undervalued prices or losing their jobs. Hence, 
entrenched managers could actually be less focused on the short-term stock price (less myopic) 
and thus less concerned about analyst coverage. This motivates a boarder measure of 
governance. The second proxy I use is the corporate governance quotient (CGQ) industry index 
by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).7 ISS gathers data on 63 different issues in the four 
broad governance categories, namely, board of directors, audit, anti-takeover, managerial 
compensation/ownership. A firm’s CGQ industry score is based on all 63 categories with 
proprietary weights on each category. For e.g., a technology firm with a CGQ industry score of 
75 has better governance than 75% of all technology firms. For this proxy, I set FirmCharijt= 
PoorGovCGQijt= 1 when the firm’s score is in the lowest tercile of firms.8  
                                                 
7 Other studies that have employed ISS data are Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007), Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2008), Brown and Caylor (2006), and Aggarwal and Williamson (2006). Unlike the G-index which is 
only available for bigger firms, ISS provides a larger universe of firms although it is only available annually from 
2001-2006. 
8 One concern about governance indices is that their usage promotes a “one size fits all” view of corporate 
governance (see for e.g., the arguments and evidence in Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008) and Gillan, Hartzell, 
and Starks (2006)). The G-index suffers from such criticisms since it considers only one aspect of governance. The 
CGQ is certainly not immune to the “one size fits all” argument even though it considers various aspects of 
governance. One mitigating fact, however, is that the CGQ used here measures relative governance scores within an 
industry and not absolute governance scores across the whole universe of firms.  
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 Hypothesis 2B: High CEO delta worsens the affiliation bias 
The next key variable considered is CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price. This directly 
proxies for the potential benefits to the CEO when the firm’s stock price goes up. Of course, all 
firm managers should aim to maximize shareholder value. However, if stock price can be 
manipulated, firms whose managers’ wealth depends more on the stock price could be pressured 
to artificially inflate the stock price for their own benefit. For e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) find that earnings manipulation is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s 
compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings (see also, Kadan and 
Yang (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005)).9  
Another related study is Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) who model a setting 
where the stock price reflects not only the fundamental value of the firm but also a short-term 
speculative component. In this case, optimal compensation contracts may emphasize short-term 
stock performance, at the expense of long-run fundamental value. Equity-based compensation 
could thus create an incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the 
speculative component in the stock price. 
 I use Execucomp to compute the change in the CEO’s wealth for a one percent change in 
stock price, following the one-year approximation method by Core and Guay (2002), also used in 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Low (2008). The CEO delta is the sum of the stock 
holdings delta and the option holdings delta.10 For each calendar year, the variable HighDeltaijt is 
set to one if the firm’s prior fiscal year CEO delta is in the highest tercile of CEO deltas among 
                                                 
9 One can argue that managers may also want to manipulate stock price downwards during times of stock option 
grants. However, such manipulation is unlikely dominate when we examine the level of affiliation bias over the 
whole year. Further, the impact of new grants is less of a concern when the underlying manager already has existing 
wealth that is very sensitive to stock price. 
10 I also recalculate the delta by excluding unexercisable options and find similar results. This is mainly because 
the tests rely on a dummy variable to indicate high delta firms and there is a high correlation between firms 
identified as high delta and those identified as having high exercisable delta. 
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 all firms with available data.11 When there is more than one CEO associated with a firm-year, 
the delta values are averaged for that firm-year.  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Stock recommendations  
Individual analyst recommendations are from Thomson Financial’s I/B/E/S Detail U.S. 
File from 1993-2006. The use of I/B/E/S potentially raises concerns because of the problem 
reported in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2008). They find inconsistencies in matched 
observations across seven downloads of I/B/E/S recommendations data between 2000 and 2007. 
To mitigate the impact of such alterations, I create an I/B/E/S spliced data set. 1993-2000 is the 
first half of the spliced dataset and comes from an I/B/E/S snapshot on January 19, 2001. To the 
extent that the I/B/E/S alterations were a result of analysts or brokers trying to touch up their pre-
regulation stock-picking histories during the period of heightened regulatory scrutiny, an earlier 
snapshot could be closer to an “as-was” tape. The second half from 2001 to 2006 is from a 
March 15, 2007 snapshot. Ljunqqvist et al. report that Thomson reinstated missing analyst names 
in the history file as of February 12, 2007 and hence the March 2007 snapshot should reflect 
such corrections. 
When computing quarter-end relative ratings, outstanding ratings are used. A rating is 
outstanding if it is less than one year old. If the rating is between one and two years old, it is 
treated as outstanding only if the analyst issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm in last 
                                                 
11 Defining all binary FirmCharijt variables by quintiles instead of terciles does not affect the results. The benefit 
of terciles is that I will have more nonzero observations when FirmCharijt is interacted with Affliatedijt, hence 
increasing the power of the tests. 
 10
 one year (matching to the I/B/E/S Detail Earnings Forecast File).12 The consensus includes 
ratings made by anonymous analysts—this is possible since I/B/E/S does not anonymize the 
broker code. The regressions exclude observations where the average number of analysts in the 
quarterly consensus is <3 so that relative ratings are based on a reasonable number of analysts.  
3.2. Firm and analyst variables  
Using information from CRSP, I remove non-ordinary shares from the sample (share 
codes not 10 or 11), and exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and regulated utilities 
(SIC codes 4900-4949).  
I also compute other firm control variables that have been shown to impact overall 
analyst optimism. Ljungqvist et al. (2007) suggest that institutional ownership is a moderating 
force on optimism (see also, Guidolin and Mola (2008)). Each year, I compute from Thomson 
13f the average quarterly-reported proportion of the firm’s shares that are held by institutions. 
Next, I obtain the prior December CRSP market capitalization of the firm as a control for firm 
size. The book-to-market ratio is computed from Compustat data following the definition in 
Fama and French (2006). 
Analyst-level variables are also useful when looking at the determinants of overall 
optimism. I compute analyst experience as the number of quarters since the analyst began issuing 
recommendations for the firm. The number of firms covered by the analyst is also used a proxy 
for the busyness of the analyst.  
                                                 
12 Most studies use a one-year old stale screen. This criterion is too stringent because in I/B/E/S, the average time 
it takes for an analyst to revise a recommendation is 274 days and 25% of the time it takes more than 360 days. By 
refining the stale recommendation criterion, I avoid excluding outstanding recommendations that would be 
considered stale by other studies. The fact that the analyst issued a recent earnings forecast for the firm is consistent 
with continuing active coverage. My results are insensitive to using a one-year stale criterion.  
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 3.3. Equity issuance data 
From the SDC’s New Issues database, I extract all primary and secondary equity issues 
from 1991-2006 and match to I/B/E/S using both the issuer’s ultimate parent CUSIP and the 
issuer’s own CUSIP (since the offering could affect analyst behavior for the issuing and parent 
firm). IssuedEquityijt equals one if the firm-year is associated with equity issuance in the years [-
1,-3] where year 0 is the filing year (if missing, then the issue year).  
An analyst affiliation dummy variable Affiliatedijt equals one if the analyst’s broker is a 
lead- or co-manager in [-1,-3] years around the equity issue. To code this variable, the manager 
names in SDC are hand-matched to broker names in I/B/E/S. Thomson provided the I/B/E/S 
Recommendation Broker Translation File upon request. When a broker is acquired or merged, 
the successor bank inherits the issuance relationships from the year of the merger. For e.g., 
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette was merged with Credit Suisse in 2000. Hence, Credit Suisse 
inherits issuance relationships (if still active as defined by the [-1,-3] window) of Donaldson 
Lufkin & Jenrette from 2000 onwards. I use Figure 1 of Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm 
(2006) and the appendix of Corwin and Schultz (2005) to determine merger relationships and the 
years of occurrence.13  
I also define a proxy for underwriter reputation. First, I compute the share of the 
industry’s (updated 30 industry definitions by Fama and French (1997)) equity issuance proceeds 
commanded by the bank in the prior calendar year. This variable is similar in spirit to the 
                                                 
13 For SDC brokers that are not mentioned in these two sources, the “ultimate parent of manager” field in SDC 
shows the current subsidiary or merger relationships of the bank. This field is backfilled by SDC whenever a bank 
merges so that the merged bank is shown as the subsidiary’s ultimate parent even in the prior-merger years. I undo 
such backfilling by using the Internet to determine the exact year of the merger. 
 12
 underwriter reputation measure in Megginson and Weiss (1991).14 The second reputation 
measure is the number of recommendations that the bank issued in the industry during the prior 
year. This proxies for the overall amount of analyst research that bank produced in that particular 
industry.  
3.4. Post-2000 regulatory reform  
In most specifications, I also include an interaction term Post2000×Affiliated so as to test 
whether the affiliation bias attenuates across the pre and post-regulation period. Post2000=1 for 
the years after 2000. Post-2000 regulations include Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), passed 
in August 2000, which specifically aimed at reducing the channel of private information release 
from firms to their favored analysts. The Global Analyst Research Settlement in 2003 and the 
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Rule 2711 in 2002 imposed reforms to limit 
the conflicts of interests between investment banking and analyst research. These reforms made 
it more difficult for banks to supply biased advice, so it is possible that the analyst affiliation bias 
disappears after these rules. The 2001 to 2006 period represents, to date, the largest sample 
employed to study the impact of the reforms in limiting analyst bias. For e.g., Boni (2006) and 
Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2008) use data up to 2004 only. Finally, I also add a control 
variable “Settlement-affected bank” that equals one 2003 onwards for the ten banks fined by the 
Settlement.15 This variable controls for the fact that these ten banks may have sharply reduced 
their overall optimism after the Settlement. 
                                                 
14 I also tried using an alternative reputation measure, the Carter and Manaster (1990) (CM) rankings, and the 
results are unchanged. Specifically, I assign a value of one if the CM rank is eight or higher on a nine-point scale 
using the modified rankings provided by Jay Ritter in Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
15 The ten are respectively, Bear Stearns, CSFB, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, UBS, and Piper Jaffray. See press statement in http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-
54.htm. 
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 3.5. Descriptive statistics of sample 
[Table 1 here] 
The sample descriptive statistics are reported annually in Table 1. From Panel A, we see 
that the final 1994-2006 panel contains 336,279 firm-analyst-year observations of relative 
recommendations. As expected, the relative recommendations are close to zero although most 
values are above zero except for the year 2000. The total number of unique firms in the 13 year 
period is 6,157. The rest of the columns in Panel A report the average of firm level attributes for 
the panel. The average market cap for a firm is slightly over $3 billion and the average number 
of analysts making up the consensus for typical firm in the sample year is 8.56. The institutional 
ownership of a typical firm increases over time from 46% to 71%. 
 The average CEO delta for a firm in the sample is $1.21 million. This indicates that the 
CEO’s wealth would change by $1.21 million due to a one percent change in the stock price of 
the firm. This number is larger than the average delta of $600,000 reported in Coles et al. (2006) 
and could be due to two factors. First, the sample in this study focuses on larger firms and from a 
more recent sample period. Second, there are outliers that skew the average—the median delta in 
the sample is $235,862. In any case, the magnitudes do not affect my results since I rely on a 
dummy variable instead of the raw values of delta to identify the impact of high CEO delta on 
the analyst affiliation bias. For the governance attributes, the average number of anti-takeover 
provisions that a firm has is 9. The average CGQ index score of 61 implies that the sample tilts 
towards firms that are better governed than the average firm in the CGQ universe.  
Panel B of Table 1 next describes the analyst-level variables. There are a total number of 
8,365 unique analysts in the sample. The peak in the number of analysts occurs in 2001 and 
drops after that, consistent with views that research departments downsized in the post-regulation 
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 years (Boni (2006)). The average experience that an analyst has in covering firm j is 6.59 
quarters and the average number of firms covered is 7.96.  
Finally, Panel C of Table 1 counts the instances where the dummy variables equal one in 
the panel of firm-analyst-year observations. An observation is associated with an equity issue in 
the last three years 29.77% of the time. 9.54% of the sample’s relative recommendations are 
associated with an analyst whose bank is affiliated with an equity offering in the last three years. 
For the firm characteristics that test the hypotheses, I report the percentage of non-missing 
observations where the dummy variables are equal to one. We see that 30.70% of the relative 
recommendations are issued on firms with G-index values greater or equal to 10. Since the G-
index is usually available for larger firms, 38.79% of the observations do not have G-index data 
(reported in the last row of Panel B). For the CGQ however, for which data begins only in 2001, 
only 16.36% of observations do not have CGQ data in this period. 25.44% of the non-missing 
CGQ observations are associated with firms that have the lowest tercile of CGQ scores. For high 
CEO delta, 46.3% of the non-missing observations are associated with firms in the highest tercile 
of CEO delta. That the percentage is greater than one-third shows that there is more analyst 
coverage for high CEO delta firms.  
[Table 2 here] 
Table 2 describes the equity issuance data from 1991 to 2006 that can be matched to the 
sample. Pre-1994 equity issuance data is required since analyst affiliation is assumed to last for 
three years. The issuance sample contains a total of 235 unique banks who function as lead 
managers or co-managers of the offerings for a total of 5,413 unique firms responsible for 7,329 
deals. This sample of equity deals is likely to be representative of the deals examined in prior 
research. For e.g., James and Karceski (2006) examine a sample of 1,355 IPOs from 1996-2000. 
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 My sample contains a comparable 1,548 IPOs from 1996-2000. Turning to deal characteristics, 
secondary offerings have mean proceeds of $183 million and are associated with 1.89 lead-
managers and 2.88 co-managers. IPOs have mean proceeds of $175 million and an average of 
1.30 lead-managers and 2.55 co-managers. The trend of having multiple managers in recent 
years is similar in spirit to Hu and Ritter (2007)’s observation that firms are more likely to go 
with multiple bookrunners in recent years, possibly motivated by issuers trying to increase their 
own bargaining power in the securities deal.   
4. Results 
4.1. Event time analyst affiliation bias by types of firms 
Figure 1 plots the affiliation bias in event time. I include firms-years around [-3,5] years 
from an equity offering. I then take the average affiliated minus the average unaffiliated Relrecijt 
for each firm-year and plot this affiliation bias for different types of firms. 
The first graph shows the analyst affiliation bias for firms with poor G-index scores 
versus other firms. Dashed red lines show the bias for high G-index firms and the unbroken 
black lines show the bias for all other firms. In general, affiliated analysts have outstanding 
quarterly recommendations that are 0.1 to 0.2 rating points higher than unaffiliated analysts and 
this bias peaks in the year of the offering. Three years after the offering, the affiliation bias 
virtually vanishes. One can interpret this as consistent with hypothesis 1—that regardless of the 
type of firm, affiliated analysts are in general more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts.  
A 0.2 rating point difference could seem trivial. However, one piece of evidence that 
investors do not think this is trivial is that they do indeed discount recommendations from 
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 affiliated analysts in terms of the recommendation’s stock market reaction (shown in a later 
table).   
One also observes that the affiliation bias is larger for poor G-index score firms and high 
CEO delta firms. This stronger bias is more pronounced in the first two years after the offering. 
For low CGQ score firms, for which we have data only from 2001-2006, there is only modest 
evidence of a greater affiliation bias. Overall, there is some support for hypotheses 2A and 2B, 
that the analyst affiliation bias is more serious for poorly governed firms and high CEO delta 
firms. However, the evidence here is only suggestive since there are no controls yet for analyst or 
firm attributes. 
4.2. Determinants of relative optimism  
I now estimate a panel regression that examines the determinants of relative optimism. 
Regression analysis allows for stronger conclusions because one can control for other firm and 
analyst attributes that explain analyst optimism. RelRecijt is the dependent variable in Table 3. 
The explanatory variables include the Affiliated dummy, an IssuedEquity dummy, hypothesized 
firm characteristic interacted with the Affiliated dummy, and various control variables commonly 
featured in the literature.  
We first look at specification 1 (G-index specification). The coefficient on Affiliated is 
positive and significant. Affiliated analysts maintain an outstanding relative rating 0.066 higher 
than all other analysts, controlling for all other determinants of relative optimism. This overall 
affiliation bias finding is consistent hypothesis 1 and with Lin and McNichols (1998). There is 
also no evidence that post regulatory analyst reform succeeded in removing the affiliation bias 
since the coefficient on Post2000×Affiliated is insignificantly negative. Hypothesis 2A asks if 
the affiliated analyst bias is different for poorly governed firms. A positive coefficient on 
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 nAffiliatiodexPoorGovGin ×  indicates that poor G-index firms had analyst affiliation biases that 
were larger than that for other firms. We see that the coefficient for 
 is positive but insignificant—no evidence that poor G-index firms 
are associated with stronger analyst affiliation biases.  
nAffiliatiodexPoorGovGin ×
[Table 3 here] 
In specification 2, the coefficient on nAffiliatioHighdelta×  tests whether firms whose 
CEOs have higher deltas are associated with larger analyst affiliation biases (hypothesis 2B). 
Column 2 shows that this coefficient is positive and significant. The affiliated analyst bias of 
high CEO delta firms is 0.047 rating points higher than the affiliated analyst bias afflicting all 
other firms. In specification 3 (with G-index variables added), the additional bias is 0.064 rating 
points. Interestingly, the coefficient for Affiliated is no longer statistically significant (at least in 
this specification), signifying that once we control for the differences in affiliation bias across 
corporate governance and high delta dimensions, the affiliation bias is indistinguishable from 
zero.  
One observation across specifications 2 and 3 is that the coefficient for HighDelta is 
significantly negative, which means that analysts are in general less optimistic for high delta 
firms. This is surprising but perhaps can be explained by the fact that high delta can align the 
manager’s interest with shareholders, and hence reduce analyst over-optimism in general. When 
controlling for corporate governance with the G-index however, the negative coefficient remains. 
Improving the proxy for corporate governance with the CGQ index, we find that the negative 
coefficient on HighDelta becomes attenuated. Importantly, HighDelta×Affiliated remains 
positive and significant even in specification 5.  
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 Specification 4 and 5 also tests if poor governance as proxied by the CGQ index 
differentiates the affiliation bias across firms. I find that it does. In specification 5, the affiliation 
bias is worse by 0.074 rating points. Again, we see in this “all-in” specification that the 
coefficient on Affiliated is rendered insignificant. 
How do we think about the economic significance of an additional recommendation bias 
of 0.07 points? One way is to compare this magnitude to the impact of regulatory reform in 
reducing the general optimism of analysts. We see that the ten Settlement-affected banks 
(bottommost variable) reduced their general optimism by about 0.06 to 0.09 rating points as a 
result of court action. Thus 0.07 rating points is clearly not trivial—the magnitude is at least as 
close to that of a regulatory-motivated change in overall optimism.  
The control variables in the regression also deserve some discussion. The coefficient on 
IssuedEquity is significantly negative across most specifications. This is similar to the finding in 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and could mean that analysts on average understand and expect post-
equity offering underperformance compared to other covered non-issuing firms. Consistent with 
main result of Ljungqvist et al., the coefficient on institutional ownership is usually negative and 
significant (at least for the first three specifications). Their explanation is that the presence of 
institutional investors exerts a moderating force on analyst optimism. The sign and significance 
of the other controls are also consistent with the literature. The log of the number of analysts 
covering the firm is positively associated with analyst optimism—an analyst is more optimistic 
for the firms with higher analyst coverage. This could be due to analysts being more likely to 
cover a stock when they predict better prospects for the firm. The number of firms covered by an 
analyst is negatively associated with relative optimism. Log of the B/M ratio is positively related 
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 to relative optimism meaning that analysts are in general more optimistic for value firms than 
they are for growth firms.16  
The average prior quarter return serves as a control variable because an analyst covering 
multiple firms could be more optimistic for one firm because that firm stock price has performed 
well recently. The estimated coefficient on this variable is however mixed. The two proxies for 
bank reputation, market share and number of issued recommendations, are negatively related to 
relative optimism. This could be viewed as the moderating role of reputation or that the bank is 
such a large player that it does not need to use relative optimism as a tool to retain investment 
banking business.  
5. Market reaction to affiliation bias and further tests 
5.1. Does the market discount recommendations of firms with worse affiliation biases? 
The main finding is that affiliated analysts’ over-optimism is stronger for some firms. 
The next natural question is to ask whether the market sees through such biases (see for e.g., 
Michaely and Womack (1999) and Lin and McNichols (1998)). Mehran and Stulz (2007) argue 
that conflicts on interests will not have an adverse impact if the market understands conflicts and 
is able to “debias” recommendations.  
I repeat the main analysis except that the dependent variable is now the average rating 
change CAR for the analyst-firm-year. CAR is computed as the sum of daily abnormal return 
(AR) over a three day window around the event date. AR is the raw CRSP return minus the 
return on an equally-weighted average return of a portfolio matched on size, B/M, and 
momentum, as in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) (using net of market return 
                                                 
16 Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2002) also find similar evidence.  
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 CARs obtains similar results). Since the dependent variable is the recommendation CAR, I add 
the average rating change and rating level after the rating change as controls. 
[Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the results. The coefficients on average rec-change and rec-level are both 
positive and significant. A unit rating change brings about an additional CAR of 1.5% to 2%. 
The significantly negative coefficient on Affiliated shows that the market understands the overall 
affiliation bias—an affiliated analyst’s rating change CAR is reduced by between 0.7% to 1.4%. 
A negative coefficient means that upgrades (downgrades) by affiliated analysts have a smaller 
positive (larger negative) event CAR reaction, consistent with the market adjusting for affiliated 
analyst optimism. Interestingly, the positive coefficients on Post2000×Affiliated reveal that the 
market reduced their discounting of affiliated recommendations in the post-regulation period. 
This is surprising since we did not find any material drop in the affiliation bias in the earlier 
table. This appears that the market assumed the attenuation of the analyst affiliation bias after 
regulatory actions. 
Earlier analyses showed that high CEO delta firms are associated with larger analyst 
affiliation biases. If the market recognizes this, the coefficient on HighDelta×Affiliated should be 
negative and significant. However, the coefficient for is not significant, suggesting that the 
market is not cognizant of the higher affiliated analyst bias on such firms. Looking at 
PoorGovCGQ×Affiliated, we see some evidence the market further discounts affiliated analyst 
recommendations on poor CGQ index firms (-0.688, t=1.86 in specification 4), but this 
coefficient is not significant once we control for the other firm characteristic interactions 
(specification 5).   
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 5.2. Instrument for affiliation: Presence of a Star analyst 
If relative optimism can help banks win investment banking deals, then the causality may 
run from the dependent variable to the independent variable. Our main analysis mitigates the 
effect of such reverse causality since lags of affiliation instead of future or current affiliation 
defines the investment banking relationship. This means that Affiliatedijt takes a value of one 
when the broker underwrote an offering for the firm in any of the prior three calendar years.  
Another method is to use an instrument for Affiliatedijt. It is difficult to find an instrument 
for affiliation—as evident by the lack of guidance in the literature. I propose that whether the 
bank has an All-Star analyst is a possible instrument for affiliation. To be a valid instrument, the 
All-Star variable must meet two conditions. First, it should be correlated with affiliation. 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Cliff and Denis (2004) contend that firms are willing to pay to 
obtain analyst coverage from Star analysts. Thus it is conceivable that having a Star analyst in 
the research team will increase the chances of a bank winning the next mandate. The second 
criteria for a good instrument is that All-Star should not be correlated with relative optimism 
except through affiliation. I find, in my sample, little evidence that All Star is related to relative 
optimism. When RelRecijt is regressed on an All-Star indicator variable plus a constant, the slope 
coefficient is statistically insignificant (-0.012, t=-1.19). When All-Star is added to the Table 3 
specifications, three of specifications produce insignificantly positive All-Star coefficients, one is 
insignificantly negative, and one is significantly negative at the 10% level. That All-Star is 
unrelated to optimism is not unlikely. On one hand, if All-Star is a proxy for reputation, then that 
reputation may be a moderating force for bias. On the other hand, if optimism is detrimental to 
an analyst’s reputation, a mediocre analyst may be less willing to use optimism to win deals for 
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 its banks or to get management access. Therefore, the All-Star variable may serve as a 
reasonable instrument to confirm the main results.  
Analyst rankings are collected from Institutional Investor Magazine and a firm-year-
analyst observation has All-Star=1 when the analyst is ranked as an All-American (first, second, 
third team, or runner-up) in the prior October polls. The first stage of the instrumental variable 
estimation is a probit of Affiliated against the All-Star variable. The bank’s industry market share 
of equity proceeds, and the log number of recommendations issued last year are added as 
controls since these are important determinants of deal winning. I confirm that the coefficient on 
the All-Star variable is significantly positive (0.14, z=7.03), i.e., that it does actually predict 
affiliation. The predicted probability of Affiliated is then used a second stage regression of the 
determinants of relative recommendations and reported in Table 5.  
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 confirms our prior results. The coefficient on HighDelta interacted with the 
predicted affiliation probability is positive and significant. None of the interactions involving 
corporate governance proxies are statistically significant. Hence, one can view our overall 
evidence of greater affiliation biases for poorly governed firms as mixed.  
5.3. Future returns for affiliated analyst-hyped versus non-hyped stocks 
The strongest affiliation bias result is for high CEO delta firms and the market also does 
not seem to further discount this bias. I interpret this as the market not understanding that 
affiliated analysts are more biased for high CEO delta firms. However, one alternative argument 
is that affiliated analysts simply have more positive private information than unaffiliated analysts 
for such firms (McNichols and O'Brien (1997)), which is why the market does not further 
discount affiliated recommendations.  
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 If the selection story were true—that affiliated analysts of high delta firms hype stocks 
because they have private information—a portfolio of high delta firms with affiliated analyst 
hype would outperform a similar portfolio of high delta firms without hype. Focusing on high 
delta firms, I form a calendar-time “hype portfolio” every quarter beginning 1994 and ending 
2006 by buying these firms whenever the end-of-quarter relative recommendation of an affiliated 
analyst is positive. This is implemented for three years from the January after the offering year, 
corresponding to the years where Affiliated=1 in the regressions. I assume perfect foresight and 
start holding the stock at the beginning of the quarter that hype is determined. If the RelRecijt is 
not positive, the stock enters the non-hyped portfolio. If the hype portfolio significantly 
outperforms the non-hype portfolio, this would support a self-selection explanation for why 
affiliated analysts hype high delta stocks.  
 [Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports the average returns of these calendar time portfolios. Panel A focus on 
high delta firms. We see that there is no evidence that the hyped portfolio outperforms the non-
hyped portfolio in raw returns or risk-adjusted (Fama-French model alphas) returns. In fact, the 
hyped minus non-hyped portfolio returns are significantly negative, meaning that hyped stocks 
underperform non-hyped high delta firms. Similar findings surface whether we use equal-
weighted or value-weighted portfolios. Hence I find no support for the self-selection story as an 
alternative explanation for the results. Panel B shows similar average returns for PoorGovCGQ 
firms. There is also no statistical difference in the hype minus non-hype portfolios for 
PoorGovCGQ firms.  
 24
 5.4. Post-offering quid quo pro evidence 
If firms are indeed urging affiliated analysts to issue over-optimistic advice, why would 
affiliated analysts play the game? And what benefit do firms gain in trying to get its stock 
hyped? While it is difficult to find direct evidence of qui quo pro, I offer some suggestive (i.e. 
“smoking gun”) evidence, focusing particularly on high delta firms. First, we look at whether 
hyped high delta firms are more likely to issue equity again compared to non-hyped high delta 
firms. To make sure that the year of optimism precedes the future offerings, I define hype in the 
first year after the offering (if RelRecijt is positive) and look at incidences of future equity 
offerings in the years [2,5] after the offering. Panel A of Table 7 reports the results. 9.8% of the 
hype group observations are associated with a future equity issue and only 9.2% of the non-hype 
group are associated with a future equity offering. The difference of 0.6% is not significant 
according to the two proportion z-test. However, when we look at the conditional probability that 
the hyping bank wins the next mandate compared to the non-hyping bank, we see that hyping 
banks win the next deal with 66.7% probability and non-hyping banks only with 29.9% 
probability. The evidence extends to both winning lead and co appointments. In fact, the 
probability of winning co-appointments is 35.7%, slightly higher than the probability of winning 
lead appointments (31.0%). That optimism can win co-appointments is consistent with 
Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009). Overall, the results here suggest that banks that hype 
high delta firms’ stock are more likely to be rewarded with future deal business.  
Next, in Panel B, I investigate whether high delta firms benefit from the hype by 
examining the net sales of stock by firm CEOs after the equity offering. Here, it is necessary to 
define hype contemporaneously with the period where the net sales are measured since we want 
to determine if the hype is accompanied by stock sales. Using Thomson Financial’s Insider 
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 Filings, net stock sales is defined as the CEO’s stock sales (trancode S) minus purchases (P), 
expressed in number of shares, scaled by the CRSP prior-December total shares outstanding. The 
hyped group are those observations where the average RelRecijt is positive for the three years 
after the offering (corresponds to the period where Affiliated=1 in the regressions). Observations 
in the hyped group are associated with CEO net sales in the year 1 of the offering of 0.818%. 
The non-hyped group has significantly lower net sales of 0.647% of shares outstanding. This 
difference is likewise manifested when looking net sales for three years after the offering instead 
of one year.   This implies that high delta CEOs are off-loading shares on average to benefit from 
analyst hype.   
[Table 7 here] 
5.5. Other firm characteristics 
These two characteristics are by no means exhaustive dimensions to consider the cross-
section of the affiliation bias. I considered two other characteristics in unreported tests. Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) argue that analyst coverage became more important in recent years because of 
higher valuations. Since there is little ambiguity in valuing assets in place, analyst research has 
the most impact on the valuation of growth opportunities. In other words, the potential dollar 
boost in valuations as a result of biased research would be larger and more attractive for growth 
firms than for other firms. Or James and Karceski (2006), who find that affiliated analysts are 
more willing to issue optimistic advice for poorly performing IPOs. This could be due to a prior 
commitment between the bank and the firm for the bank to provide booster shots in the face of 
poor aftermarket performance. This could mean that the analyst affiliation bias is worse for firms 
that have poor stock market performance. I investigate these two dimensions in robustness tests 
and find little consistent evidence that the affiliation bias varies along these two dimensions. 
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 6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the analyst affiliation bias differs across firms. I 
conjecture that firms with certain characteristics are more likely to pressure affiliated analysts to 
issue over-optimistic recommendations. I find mixed evidence that the analyst affiliation bias is 
stronger for poorly governed firms and robust evidence that it is stronger for high CEO delta 
firms. Even in the post-regulation period where new rules supposedly mitigate analyst conflicts 
high CEO delta firms continue to exhibit larger analyst affiliation biases. These results suggest 
that regulators have only succeeded partially in mitigating analyst conflicts of interests. For a 
subgroup of firms, analysts affiliated with the equity issuing firm continue to exhibit excessive 
optimism. Altogether, this study posits that the analyst affiliation bias is not unequivocal across 
all firms. Regulators that focus their action on curtailing the behavior of investment banks may 
have neglected the possibility that firms also have a corresponding role in pressuring banks to 
issue over-optimistic research.  
Interestingly, the market appears also not to be fully cognizant of such biases since 
investors’ event reaction to rating changes does not appropriately discount the affiliated 
recommendations that contain more bias, even though affiliated analyst hype is associated with 
lower future returns. For high delta firms, I also find suggestive evidence of qui quo pro in that 
hyping banks are associated with more future deal business. CEOs with high delta also sell more 
stock when their firm’s stock is hyped by affiliated analysts.  
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Table 1  
Annual descriptive statistics of firm-analyst-year sample 
The panel of 336,279 firm-analyst-year relative recommendation observations are summarized annually. A firm-
year relative recommendation is the analyst’s average quarter-end outstanding rating minus the outstanding 
median consensus rating. Data are from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail File 1994-2006. I reverse ratings (5 for strong 
buy and 1 for sell, etc.) so that higher ratings correspond to greater optimism. Panel A’s firm variables are 
computed by first collapsing the firm-analyst-year observations into unique firm-years and then taking the 
average within each year. The percentage of shares held by institutions is from Thomson 13f, CEO Delta is 
computed from Execucomp as in Core and Guay (2002), G-index of Gompers et al. (2003) is from IRRC, 
industry CGQ index is from ISS, and the last December market cap is from CRSP. I exclude firms with SIC 
codes 6000-6999 (financials) and 4949-4999 (regulated utilities), and share codes that are non-ordinaries (codes 
not 10 or 11). Panel B reports analyst variables, computed by collapsing observations into unique analyst-years 
and taking the average within each year. Panel C reports the percentage of firm-analyst-year observations that 
are nonzero for the binary variables. IssuedEquity=1 when the firm issued equity in the prior three calendar 
years, Affiliated=1 when the analyst’s bank was the lead- or co-manager for an equity issue in the prior three 
years. HighDelta=1 when the firm is in the highest tercile based on the prior year CEO Delta, PoorGovGindex=1 
when the G-index≥10, PoorGovCGQ=1 when industry CGQ score for that year is in the lowest tercile. The last 
row of Panel C reports % observations with no data to compute the binary variables (the CGQ proportion is 
based on available years of 2001-2006).  
# Unique firms A
anal
1994 17,143 0.048 2,059
1995 21,658 0.055 2,408
1996 21,150 0.038 2,644
1997 24,157 0.025 2,939
1998 27,058 0.022 3,052
1999 29,874 0.013 3,128
2000 30,620 -0.020 3,031
2001 28,912 0.025 2,583
2002 27,967 0.042 2,337
2003 27,000 0.103 2,223
2004 26,891 0.073 2,281
2005 27,099 0.065 2,399
2006 26,750 0.071 2,422
All Years 336,279 0.042 6,157
Year
# Firm-
analyst-
years
Avg relative 
rec
vg # 
ysts per 
firm
Avg % held by 
Institutions
Avg CEO 
Delta 
($m)
Avg G-
Index 
Avg CGQ 
index
Avg 
mktcap 
($m)
7.97 46.01% 0.59 9.44 . 1,594
7.99 46.16% 0.54 9.36 . 1,410
7.08 44.73% 0.66 9.35 . 1,772
7.06 46.10% 0.84 9.41 . 1,945
7.49 46.55% 1.15 8.67 . 2,410
8.13 45.78% 1.48 8.71 . 3,126
8.62 46.74% 2.15 8.97 . 4,392
9.45 51.10% 1.60 8.98 51.92 4,219
10.00 57.27% 1.44 8.94 58.32 4,082
10.22 62.06% 1.11 8.96 60.62 3,267
9.87 67.27% 1.25 9.05 64.19 4,198
9.32 67.95% 1.25 9.08 63.11 4,400
9.03 70.51% 1.44 9.03 63.12 4,454
8.56 53.02% 1.21 9.04 60.92 3,173
Panel A: Firm Variables
   
# Unique  
brokers
# Unique 
analysts
Avg # qtrs 
experience
Avg # firms 
per analyst
% 
IssuedEquity
% Affiliated % Gindex 
Poor Gov
% CGQ 
Poor Gov 
%  High 
CEO Delta
1994 140 1,693 2.05 10.47 31.81% 8.32% 41.48% na 40.13%
1995 164 2,045 3.93 10.05 28.17% 7.53% 40.77% na 42.40%
1996 191 2,231 4.89 9.00 31.39% 9.56% 39.60% na 43.72%
1997 233 2,640 5.25 8.41 34.05% 11.12% 40.12% na 44.81%
1998 254 3,074 5.67 8.00 36.12% 11.74% 29.34% na 45.41%
1999 267 3,317 6.16 8.00 29.10% 9.20% 29.47% na 45.79%
2000 251 3,502 6.68 7.64 31.76% 10.44% 30.99% na 47.74%
2001 247 3,592 6.99 6.96 36.64% 12.19% 31.16% 32.44% 49.59%
2002 234 3,521 7.34 7.06 34.78% 11.29% 25.99% 31.15% 50.32%
2003 259 3,222 7.73 7.62 26.31% 8.27% 26.77% 23.49% 49.55%
2004 290 3,005 8.15 7.90 20.84% 6.77% 27.24% 23.87% 48.89%
2005 305 3,109 8.38 7.53 21.95% 7.62% 26.86% 22.25% 46.99%
2006 299 3,130 8.66 7.38 24.41% 8.96% 25.63% 22.77% 45.22%
All Years 577 8,365 6.59 7.96 29.77% 9.54% 30.70% 25.44% 46.55%
# Missing observations 0.00% 0.00% 38.79% 16.36% 39.22%
Panel B: Analyst Variables
Year
Panel C: Binary Variables
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Table 2 
Sample of equity issuances  
The sample of equity issuances is from Thomson’s SDC New Issues database. Lead- or co-managers of the deal are hand-matched to I/B/E/S broker names from 
the recommendations broker translation file. The listed deals are those which are represented in the sample in Table 1. These are deals which can be matched to 
I/B/E/S through either SDC’s issuer cusip or the issuer’s ultimate parent cusip, and have valid CRSP and Compustat data. The year of offering is the year of the 
filing date or the year of the issue date if the filing date is missing. Although the sample period in Table 1 is 1994-2006, the deals here go back to 1991 because 
analyst affiliation is tracked up to three years after the offering.  
 
# Lead mgrs 
per
# Co-mgrs 
per deal 
Mean deal 
proceeds ($m)
Mean gross 
spread ($m)
# Lead 
mgrs per
# Co-mgrs 
per deal 
Mean deal 
proceeds ($m)
Mean gross 
spread ($m)
1991 358 199 159 353 69 1.02 1.52 $99.09 $4.48 1.01 1.33 $58.07 $3.97
1992 390 194 196 386 86 1.01 1.76 $99.07 $3.95 1.02 1.37 $68.52 $4.47
1993 617 305 312 608 108 1.01 1.78 $104.77 $4.41 1.01 1.49 $84.29 $5.36
1994 391 199 192 384 104 1.02 1.81 $98.71 $4.00 1.01 1.34 $52.00 $3.48
1995 673 365 308 664 116 1.03 2.06 $94.12 $4.39 1.03 1.71 $65.25 $4.58
1996 886 433 453 863 133 1.05 2.37 $115.27 $5.41 1.02 1.84 $89.33 $5.47
1997 676 376 300 669 118 1.05 2.52 $112.43 $5.35 1.02 1.84 $69.45 $4.98
1998 432 260 172 422 99 1.12 3.07 $169.32 $7.20 1.15 3.23 $302.21 $14.79
1999 711 332 379 668 102 1.35 3.72 $261.47 $10.96 1.16 3.02 $158.39 $9.41
2000 541 297 244 509 89 1.38 3.19 $268.64 $11.90 1.30 3.03 $345.55 $16.08
2001 262 225 37 246 88 1.74 3.30 $255.62 $11.05 1.60 3.59 $876.71 $30.47
2002 221 181 40 212 89 1.75 3.49 $214.80 $9.07 1.67 4.47 $154.82 $11.35
2003 286 233 53 271 92 1.63 3.57 $224.65 $8.14 2.26 3.07 $274.20 $16.03
2004 361 256 105 342 97 1.89 3.12 $182.26 $7.49 1.96 4.27 $275.48 $14.92
2005 310 186 124 300 98 1.95 3.86 $301.86 $10.70 2.27 3.96 $284.26 $18.04
2006 215 155 60 210 90 1.84 3.29 $240.31 $9.83 2.18 3.32 $206.69 $13.74
Overall 7329 4196 3133 5413 235 1.36 2.88 $183.49 $7.70 1.30 2.55 $175.42 $9.73
Year Total Deals
Unique 
firms
Unique 
brokers
Secondary offerings IPOs
Secondary 
offerings IPOs
Table 3 
Determinants of analysts’ relative optimism 
This is the panel regression of firm-year-analyst observations from 1994-2006. The OLS dependent variable is the 
analyst’s average relative recommendation, which is the average outstanding quarter-end recommendation minus the 
median quarter-end consensus recommendation. Recommendations are from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail File, and I code 
ratings using 5 for strong buy and 1 for sell, etc., so that higher ratings correspond to more optimism. Affiliated=1 
when the analyst’s employer was a lead- or co-manager for the firm’s stock offering in years [-3,-1]. Broker mergers 
are accounted for by allowing successor banks to inherit the issuance relationships of predecessor banks. Equity 
issuance data are from SDC’s New Issues database. Post2000=1 for the years after 2000 to capture the impact of the 
post-regulation period. The G-index from IRRC is used here as a proxy for poor corporate governance with 
PoorGovGindex=1 for firms with G-index≥10. The other governance proxy is the industry CGQ index from ISS 
with PoorGovCGQ=1 when the firm is in the lowest tercile of the CGQ index. Specifications involving 
PoorGovCGQ are for the period 2001-2006 since CGQ data is not available for the 1994-2000 period. 
IssuedEquity=1 when the firm issued equity (IPO or SEO) in years [-3,-1]. HighDelta=1 when the firm’s prior year 
CEO delta (computed as in Core and Guay (2002) from data in Execucomp) is in the highest tercile of firms with 
CEO delta data. Institutional ownership is the proportion of the firm’s shares that are held by institutions as 
computed from Thomson’s 13f database. Other control variables are the average # of analysts that make up the 
quarter-end consensus, analyst experience defined as the number of quarters since the analyst started issuing 
recommendations for the firm, the number of firms covered by the analyst, the December-end firm market cap, B/M 
ratio (computed as in Fama and French (2006)), and the average prior quarter holding period return in a typical 
quarter for that year. Bank mkt share is computed as the fraction of all equity proceeds that the bank accounted for 
as a lead manager in the firm’s Fama-French 30-industry group in the prior year, and bank # recs in industry is the 
prior year number of recommendations issued by the bank in the covered firm’s industry. Settlement-affected 
bank=1 from 2003 onwards if the bank is one of the ten banks fined in the Global Analysts Research Settlement of 
2003. Analyst fixed effects are included. The intercept term is not reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance (based on standard errors clustered by analyst) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively with 
absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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 Table 3 (Cont’d) 
 
Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Affiliated 0.066*** 0.048*** 0.031 0.042*** 0.003
(4.56) (5.11) (1.54) (3.12) (0.12)
Post2000×Affiliated -0.014 0.002 -0.003
(0.75) (0.05) (0.14)
PoorGovGindex 0.010* 0.006 0.009
(1.75) (0.98) (0.93)
PoorGovGindex×Affiliated 0.011 0.029 0.047
(0.51) (1.22) (1.39)
HighDelta -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.014
(4.72) (4.41) (1.48)
HighDelta×Affiliated 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.078***
(2.94) (3.18) (2.65)
PoorGovCGQ -0.018*** -0.029***
(2.77) (3.10)
PoorGovCGQ×Affiliated 0.029* 0.074**
(1.69) (2.20)
IssuedEquity -0.025*** -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.018** -0.025**
(3.85) (5.92) (4.25) (2.24) (2.29)
Institutional ownership -0.034** -0.038** -0.041** 0.035** 0.012
(2.02) (2.22) (2.10) (2.04) (0.41)
Ln(market cap) -0.009*** -0.001 -0.005 0.010*** 0.004
(3.03) (0.31) (1.43) (3.08) (0.78)
Ln(B/M) 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.028***
(8.75) (9.58) (7.74) (9.02) (4.49)
Ln(# analysts) 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.095***
(12.90) (12.97) (11.75) (12.18) (8.74)
Avg prior qtr return -0.025 -0.049** -0.046* 0.063** 0.105**
(1.12) (2.35) (1.81) (2.02) (2.18)
Bank mkt share -0.166*** -0.157*** -0.153*** 0.019 0.010
(3.19) (3.05) (2.80) (0.26) (0.12)
Ln(bank's # recs in industry) -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.005
(4.64) (4.60) (3.95) (4.32) (1.18)
Ln(# firms covered) -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.030*** -0.037***
(5.14) (4.91) (4.89) (3.10) (2.95)
Ln(analyst experience) 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(5.27) (5.85) (4.29) (5.35) (3.57)
Settlement-affected bank -0.097*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.069*** -0.067***
(7.56) (7.16) (7.01) (5.63) (4.74)
# observations 195247 195197 167110 131124 79942
Adj R-sq 0.1631 0.1602 0.1705 0.1729 0.2047
Analyst fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by analyst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable: Relative recommendations 
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Table 4 
Determinants of average recommendation event CAR  
This is the panel regression of the determinants of recommendation event CARs in the pre- and post- regulation 
periods. The dependent variable is the event CAR averaged for all the recommendations issued by the analyst for the 
covered firm in that year. The CAR uses a benchmark return from a characteristics-matched portfolio as in DGTW 
(1997). Recommendations are from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail File, and I code ratings using 5 for strong buy and 1 for 
sell, etc., so that higher ratings correspond to more optimism. Average rec-change is the average rec-change of that 
firm-analyst-year observation, and average rec level is the average of the ratings issued by that firm-analyst-year,, 
Other variable definitions are in Table 3. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels respectively with absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. Specifications involving PoorGovCGQ are for 
the period 2001-2006 since CGQ data is not available for the 1994-2000 period. 
Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Avg rec-change 1.542*** 1.534*** 1.484*** 1.961*** 1.523***
(35.09) (34.88) (33.07) (34.89) (28.52)
Avg rec level 0.157*** 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.171*** 0.089
(3.59) (2.87) (2.68) (3.13) (1.64)
Affiliated -1.227*** -1.250*** -1.405*** -0.726*** -0.791**
(4.22) (4.80) (4.20) (4.07) (1.99)
Post2000×Affiliated 1.081*** 1.100*** 1.289***
(3.70) (3.65) (4.13)
PoorGovGindex 0.083* 0.047 -0.057
(1.94) (1.05) (0.98)
PoorGovGindex×Affiliated -0.075 0.270 0.219
(0.24) (1.03) (0.62)
HighDelta -0.292*** -0.276*** -0.273***
(5.41) (4.91) (3.69)
HighDelta×Affiliated -0.121 0.024 0.648
(0.43) (0.08) (1.54)
PoorGovCGQ -0.010 0.102
(0.16) (1.49)
PoorGovCGQ×Affiliated -0.688* -0.393
(1.86) (0.75)
IssuedEquity -0.361*** -0.319*** -0.305*** -0.299*** -0.038
(5.41) (4.62) (4.31) (3.60) (0.41)
Institutional ownership 0.791*** 0.110 0.424** 0.006 -0.493*
(4.38) (0.60) (2.05) (0.03) (1.87)
Ln(market cap) -0.036 -0.098*** -0.034 -0.071** -0.087**
(1.47) (3.97) (1.33) (2.39) (2.57)
Ln(B/M) 0.387*** 0.412*** 0.413*** 0.393*** 0.292***
(9.20) (10.36) (9.64) (8.81) (5.54)
Ln(# analysts) 0.157** 0.166** 0.197*** 0.277*** 0.379***
(2.29) (2.40) (2.71) (3.62) (4.46)
Avg prior qtr return 9.978*** 9.807*** 9.684*** 11.453*** 8.657***
(23.73) (22.20) (20.92) (18.00) (13.42)
Bank mkt share 0.338 0.357 0.420 1.403** 0.701
(0.70) (0.68) (0.84) (2.10) (1.09)
Ln(bank's # recs in industry) -0.069*** -0.046** -0.039 -0.031 0.015
(2.90) (2.00) (1.63) (1.00) (0.49)
Ln(# firms covered) 0.397*** 0.387*** 0.379*** 0.340*** 0.301***
(5.82) (5.60) (5.49) (3.60) (3.03)
Ln(analyst experience) 0.145*** 0.149*** 0.133*** 0.159*** 0.140***
(7.03) (7.32) (6.29) (6.60) (5.75)
Settlement-affected bank 0.059 0.032 -0.004 -0.434*** -0.421***
(0.53) (0.29) (0.04) (3.25) (3.18)
# observations 102706 102437 88148 73106 44924
Adj R-sq 0.1527 0.1510 0.1574 0.1840 0.1919
Analyst F.E & clus. by analyst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable: Avg event CAR of rec-change
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Table 5 
Determinants of relative optimism: Star analyst as instrument for affiliation 
Coefficients from the second stage of a two-stage estimation for the determinants of relative analyst optimism are 
reported. The first stage (unreported) is a probit model for the determinants of affiliation (Affiliatedijt=1) with star 
analyst as the independent variable. Affiliated=1 when the analyst’s bank was the lead- or co-manager for the firm’s 
offering in the prior three years. Star analyst=1 when the analyst was ranked as an All-American (1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 
runner-up) in the prior October’s Institutional Investor polls. The bank’s industry market share of equity offering 
proceeds in the last three years, and the number of recommendations (recs) issued by the bank last year are added as 
control variables. The predicted probability of Affiliated is then used in the second stage which estimates the 
determinants of relative recs RelRecijt. RelRecijt is the average outstanding quarter-end rec minus the median quarter-
end consensus rec. Recs are from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail File, and I code ratings using 5 for strong buy and 1 for 
sell, etc., so that higher ratings correspond to more optimism. Observations with less than three analysts per firm are 
excluded. Other variable definitions are in Table 3. Each column represents the estimation on a subsample of firm 
characteristics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively with 
signed t-statistics in parentheses. Estimations include analyst fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by 
analyst. The intercept term is not reported. Specifications involving PoorGovCGQ are for the period 2001-2006 
since CGQ data is not available for the 1994-2000 period.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affiliated 0.435* 0.742*** 0.386 0.355
(1.94) (3.28) (1.42) (1.11)
Issued equity -0.022*** -0.012** -0.003 -0.011
(3.85) (1.97) (0.45) (1.07)
PoorGovGindex 0.014 0.004
(1.63) (0.26)
PoorGovGindex×Affiliated -0.061 0.124
(0.57) (0.78)
HighDelta -0.043*** -0.027**
(5.16) (2.03)
HighDelta×Affiliated 0.291*** 0.274*
(3.01) (1.92)
PoorGovCGQ -0.016 -0.035**
(1.57) (2.37)
PoorGovCGQ×Affiliated 0.003 0.181
(0.02) (1.05)
Institutional ownership -0.037** -0.029* 0.034** 0.015
(2.15) (1.70) (2.00) (0.52)
Ln(market cap) 0.000 -0.007** 0.011*** 0.005
(0.16) (2.34) (3.31) (1.16)
Ln(B/M) 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.028***
(9.53) (8.90) (8.81) (4.41)
Ln(# analysts) 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.093*** 0.094***
(12.42) (12.38) (11.84) (8.53)
Avg prior qtr return -0.057*** -0.032 0.054* 0.088*
(2.62) (1.37) (1.65) (1.76)
Bank mkt share -0.471*** -0.563*** -0.214 -0.319*
(3.49) (4.14) (1.27) (1.74)
Ln(bank's # recs in industry) -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.010
(3.49) (3.97) (3.18) (1.52)
Ln(# firms covered) -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.036***
(4.58) (5.08) (2.77) (2.84)
Ln(analyst experience) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.015***
(6.08) (5.33) (5.66) (3.95)
Settlement-affected bank -0.095*** -0.097*** -0.063*** -0.062***
(7.16) (7.55) (5.16) (4.39)
# observations 183125 183149 123758 75547
Adj R-sq 0.1584 0.1613 0.1728 0.2048
Dependent Variable: Relative recommendations Independent variables
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Table 6 
Calendar-time portfolio returns of high delta and poor governance firms with and without 
affiliated analyst bias 
This table reports calendar-time returns of high CEO delta firms (Panel A) and poor governance CGQ firms (Panel 
B) with or without post-offering affiliated analyst hype. This tests the selection explanation for affiliated analyst 
hype—i.e. affiliated analysts hype high delta firms’ stock because they have private information about future stock 
price performance. At the start of each quarter, we form two portfolios, one that long stocks which have affiliated 
analyst hype, and another that longs stock without affiliated analyst bias. A firm-analyst-quarter has (does not have) 
affiliated analyst hype if its end of quarter RelRecijt is positive (non-positive). These are perfect foresight, i.e. not 
tradable, portfolios since they require the knowledge of end-quarter RelRecijt at the start of the quarter. The 
portfolios hold stocks starting January after the offering and tracks quarterly changes in affiliated analyst hype for 36 
months. This corresponds to the years where Affiliatedijt=1 in the earlier regressions. High delta firms are above 
median firms based on prior year CEO delta computed as in Core and Guay (2002). Reported returns are in percent 
and the monthly calendar time portfolios are from 1994-2006 for high delta firms and 2001-2006 for poor 
governance CGQ firms. Rp-Rf is the time-series average of portfolio returns in excess of the risk-free rate. Portfolio 
average returns are either equal-weighted or value-weighted. Coefficient estimates from regressing excess returns on 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model are also reported. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively with the associated signed t-statistics in parentheses.  
Intercept Rm-Rf SMB HML
Not Hyped 1.068* 0.208 1.423*** 0.232*** -0.194** 0.863 156 249.7
(1.84) (0.92) (7.04) (3.70) (-2.42)
Hyped 0.893 0.070 1.368*** 0.250*** -0.206** 0.858 156 186.7
(1.58) (0.31) (6.17) (4.01) (-2.58)
Hyped-Not -0.174** -0.138* -0.054*** 0.018 -0.012 0.037 156 436.5
(-2.42) (-1.86) (-2.74) (0.86) (-0.46)
Not Hyped 0.561 0.129 1.131*** -0.132*** -0.582*** 0.888 156 249.7
(1.10) (0.72) (2.74) (-2.64) (-9.09)
Hyped 0.303 -0.179 1.133*** -0.128** -0.474*** 0.866 156 186.7
(0.61) (-0.94) (2.63) (-2.43) (-7.02)
Hyped-Not -0.258** -0.307*** 0.001 0.004 0.108*** 0.058 156 436.5
(-2.38) (-2.78) (0.05) (0.13) (2.73)
Not Hyped 0.439 -0.286 1.768*** 0.937*** -0.451*** 0.886 72 421.8
(0.38) (-0.66) (6.87) (6.53) (-2.94)
Hyped 0.359 -0.338 1.771*** 0.891*** -0.448*** 0.898 72 287.8
(0.31) (-0.84) (7.40) (6.67) (-3.14)
Hyped-Not -0.080 -0.052 0.003 -0.046 0.003 -0.023 72 709.7
(-0.72) (-0.42) (0.09) (-1.12) (0.06)
Not Hyped -0.444 -0.533* 1.383*** 0.220** -0.505*** 0.888 72 421.8
(-0.52) (-1.71) (4.75) (2.13) (-4.58)
Hyped -0.598 -0.467 1.315*** 0.150 -0.691*** 0.862 72 287.8
(-0.69) (-1.33) (3.48) (1.29) (-5.55)
Hyped-Not -0.154 0.065 -0.067* -0.070 -0.185*** 0.169 72 709.7
(-1.15) (0.49) (-1.95) (-1.58) (-3.93)
Equal-weighted returns
Value-weighted returns
Coefficient estimates from Fama-French model
Panel A: High delta firms  
Equal-weighted returns
Panel B: Poor CGQ governance firms
Value-weighted returns
Avg # 
stocks/mth# MthsAdj R2Portfolio Rp-Rf
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Table 7 
Bank winning next mandate and firm CEO selling stock: Comparing high delta firms with 
and without affiliated analyst bias 
This table reports possible benefits to banks for hyping the stock of high CEO delta firms and the possible benefits 
to CEOs in taking advantage of this hype. Panel A reports the probability that a high CEO delta firm issues equity 
again within from years [2,5] after the offering year. Banks that hype in Panel A are those whose analyst’s Relrecijt 
is positive in the first year after the offering, i.e., not overlapping with the period where the next offering is 
measured. Panel B reports the average CEO net stock sales after a stock offering. With data from Thomson 
Financial’s Insider Filings, net stock sales is the CEO’s stock sales (trancode S) minus purchases (P), expressed in 
number of shares, scaled by the CRSP prior-December total shares outstanding. The averages reported are based on 
analyst-firm-year observations. Banks that hype in Panel B are those whose average Relrecijt is positive in the three 
years after the offering, i.e., contemporaneous to the time period where insider trading is measured. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively with the associated signed t-statistics 
(two proportion z-statistic for Panel A) in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Bank winning next mandate
Conditional on firm having another offering
Bank wins 
mandate again
Bank wins as 
lead mgr
Bank wins as 
co mgr
Banks that hype 9.8% 66.7% 31.0% 35.7%
Banks that don’t hype 9.2% 36.7% 16.3% 20.4%
Hype minus Don't 0.6% 29.9% 14.6% 15.3%
(0.98) (2.82)*** (3.01)*** (2.65)***
Probability that firm 
has another offering 
in next 4 yrs
Portfolio group
  
 
 
Panel B: Net sales minus purchases of stock by firm CEO (as percentage of shares outstanding)
Portfolio group Year 1 after offering Year 1 to 3 after offering
Banks that hyped firm stock 0.818*** 0.599***
(9.90) (7.89)
Banks that don’t hype 0.647*** 0.429***
(10.64) (8.15)
Hype minus Don't 0.172** 0.170***
(2.41) (2.66)  
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Figure 1 
Affiliated analyst bias around equity issue  
Only firms-years associated with an equity issue around a [-3,5] year window are included. An analyst’s relative 
recommendation (rec) is his quarter-end outstanding rec minus the median quarter-end consensus rec. The analyst’s 
quarter-end relative recs are averaged for the firm-year. The graphs plot for the typical firm-year, the average 
affiliated analyst bias, which is the relative rec of affiliated analysts minus the average relative rec of unaffiliated 
analysts. Affiliated analysts are those whose banks were lead- or co-managers in the IPO or SEO. Red broken lines 
denote firms with the identified firm characteristic hypothesized to affect affiliated analyst optimism and black lines 
denote all other firms. The top left graph identifies poorly governed firms proxied by a Gompers et al. (2003) G-
index score ≥10. The top right graph identifies firms whose CEOs whose compensation have high delta (highest 
tercile of CEO delta) where delta is computed as in Core and Guay (2002). The bottommost graph identifies firms in 
the lowest tercile of industry CGQ index score (where data is available only from 2001 onwards). Recs are from the 
I/B/E/S U.S. Detail File From 1994-2006, ratings are reversed (i.e., 5 for strong buy and 1 for sell, etc.) so that 
higher ratings indicate more optimism. 
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